

# Source 1 : WWI Navy Service Record for John Ackrill 1916 (ADM 188/464)

288891 *Reverport* 288891

Name in full } *John Joseph Ackrill* Date of Birth *24 January 1886*  
 Place of Birth *Dublin*  
 Occupation *Fish-vender*

Date and Period of C. S. Engagements.		Age	Height ft. in.	Hair	Eyes	Complexion	Wounds, Scars, Marks, &c.
<i>18 June 1898 - 12 yrs</i> <i>6 February 1907 - 10 comp</i> <i>1908</i>		<i>7 E.</i>	<i>5-5 1/2</i> <i>5-6 1/2</i>	<i>Brn</i>	<i>Brn</i>	<i>Fresh</i>	<i>Two scars on R. fore arm</i>

Ship, No., or port in.	List and No.	Rating	Sub-ratings			Badges	Period of Service		Character.	If Discharged, Where and for what Cause.
			Rating	From	To		From	To		
<i>Vivid II</i>	<i>15049</i>	<i>St. 2c</i>	<i>Imm</i>	<i>10.3.00</i>	<i>10.10.00</i>	<i>10.10.00</i>	<i>10.10.00</i>	<i>13.11.00</i>	<i>13.11.00</i>	
<i>Psyche</i>	<i>1512</i>	<i>"</i>	<i>Imm</i>	<i>20.1.00</i>	<i>12.1.00</i>	<i>12.1.00</i>	<i>12.1.00</i>	<i>12.1.00</i>	<i>12.1.00</i>	
<i>Vivid</i>	<i>15076</i>	<i>"</i>	<i>Imm</i>	<i>5.6.00</i>	<i>1.8.00</i>	<i>1.8.00</i>	<i>1.8.00</i>	<i>1.8.00</i>	<i>1.8.00</i>	
<i>Languan II</i>	<i>15010</i>	<i>"</i>								
<i>Vivid I</i>	<i>15010</i>	<i>"</i>								
<i>Medea</i>	<i>15026</i>	<i>"</i>								
<i>Vivid II</i>	<i>15010</i>	<i>"</i>								
<i>Magnificent</i>	<i>15091</i>	<i>"</i>								
		<i>Lt. St. 2c</i>								
		<i>St. 2c II</i>								
<i>Vivid</i>	<i>15015</i>	<i>"</i>								
<i>Blake</i>	<i>15016</i>	<i>"</i>								
<i>London</i>		<i>"</i>								
<i>India</i>		<i>"</i>								
		<i>Lt. St. 2c</i>								
<i>Severn</i>	<i>15007</i>	<i>"</i>								
		<i>Mechan</i>								
<i>Vivid I</i>	<i>15010</i>	<i>"</i>								
<i>Lowther</i>	<i>15018</i>	<i>"</i>								
<i>Vivid</i>	<i>15010</i>	<i>"</i>								
<i>India</i>	<i>15014</i>	<i>"</i>								
<i>Indefatigable</i>	<i>15032</i>	<i>"</i>								

Class for Contact.

N. P. *30441* 1910 D. D. 5166 MAY 1916. KILLED IN ACTION.

*P. J.*

# Source 1 : Transcript of WWI Navy Service Record for John Ackrill 1916 (ADM 188/464)

## Source 2 : Navy Telegram Reporting the Loss of the Indefatigable 1916 (ADM 137/1642)

TELEGRAM.		No. 995
From C. in C. Grand Fleet		DATE 2.6.16
To Admiralty		Recd. <del>11.52 p.m.</del> 2.15 a.m. 3.6.16
#		
995 Your 465 and my 994.		
At 3.50 p.m. on 31st. May V.A.C. Battle Cruiser Fleet reported himself engaged with enemy Battle Cruisers steering about E.S.E. enemy to the Northward.		
INDEFATIGABLE was sunk 10 minutes after commencement of action by shell exploding in Magazine. QUEEN MARY half an hour later probably same cause.		
Subsequent to this 5th.B.Sq. which had been in the rear got into action and shortly afterwards enemy's Battle Fleet which had been reported as in sight by 2nd.Lt.Cr.Sq. appeared and V.A. B.C.Fleet turned round followed by 5th.B.Sq. I had sent 3rd.B.C.Sq. which was 20 miles ahead of me, to support B.C.Fleet on learning of the enemy being in sight, the Battle Fleet being at this time over 30 miles to the North steering for <del>the</del> the scene of action at 20 knots. 3rd.B.C.Sq. apparently joined B.C.F. about 5.0 p.m. and INVINCIBLE was blown up either by shell in magazine or mine or torpedo.		
At 5.44 p.m. Cruisers and Lt.Cruisers ahead of Battle Fleet were seen to be altering courses to port Battle Fleet's course then being S.E. by South. The weather was very misty, visibility being about six miles to the westward and less to the eastward.		

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### Glossary

VAC : Vice Admiral Commanding

ESE : East, South East

B Sq : Battleship Squadron

Lt Cr Sq : Light Cruiser Squadron

BC : Battle Cruiser

VA : Vice Admiral

BC Sq : Battle Cruiser Squadron

BCF : Battle Cruiser Formation

Lt : Light

SE : South East

### **Source 3 : A Public Statement Made by the Navy on the Loss of the Indefatigable 1916 (ADM 137/301)**

In such a conflict as raged continuously for five hours it was inevitable that we should suffer severe losses. It was necessary to maintain touch with greatly superior forces in fluctuating visibility, often very low. We lost "INVINCIBLE", "INDEFATIGABLE" and "QUEEN MARY", from which ships there were few survivors. The casualties in other ships were heavy, and I wish to express my deepest regret at the loss of so many gallant comrades, officers and men. They died gloriously.

Exceptional skill was displayed by the Medical Officers of the Fleet. They performed operations and tended the wounded under conditions of extreme difficulty. In some cases their staff was seriously depleted by casualties, and the inevitable lack of such essentials as adequate light, hot water, &c., in ships damaged by shell fire, tried their skill, resource and physical endurance to the utmost.

As usual, the Engine Room Departments of all ships displayed the highest qualities of technical skill, discipline and endurance. High speed is a primary factor in the tactics of the squadrons under my command, and the Engine Room Departments never fail.


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## Source 4 : Private Navy Report on the Loss of the Indefatigable 1916 (ADM 1/8477/308)



The point of particular interest noted from a perusal of the reports from the Commanding Officers of the Battle Cruisers, Cruisers, and Light Cruisers, engaged in the action of the 31st May 1916, is that the Battle Cruisers were in action against enemy Battle Cruisers and Battle-ships, and that the three ships, "Indefatigable", "Queen Mary" and "Invincible" that were lost, were blown up during the early part of the action when engaged with enemy Battle Cruisers. These three ships sunk before they had received heavy punishment and the deduction is that flame reached the turret magazines causing them to explode.

It is now the generally accepted opinion that the fault to which these explosions may be attributed lay in the method adopted in the transportation of charges to the guns, whereby these charges which were not in non-inflammable cases had an open course from the magazine to the gun. This, in association with the number of charges that were usually in the Handing-room, Revolving Trunk, Working Chamber, and Gun House Provided a direct train of Cordite from the turret to the magazine.

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